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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. REID and RONALD P.
NELSON, dba CUSTOM
PROMOTIONS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
12913

NICK M. DODAS and RHODA
DODAS, his wife,
Defendants-A ppellwnts,

BRIEF

OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action on an oral contract for materials
furnished and labor performed in construction and remodelling of a restaurant and lounge known as Rhoda's
Club Charade.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Joseph G. Jeppson.
Judge, granted judgment to plaintiffs on their
plaint after denying defendants' motion to dismiss the
action of plaintiffs for the reason that plaintiffs had act.
ed as a general contractor and performed construction
work without first obtaining a license, as required by
law; that the action was barred by the statute of limita.
tions; and that the plaintiffs had failed to prove reason·
able value of the materials furnished and services per.
formed which would support the judgment against de·
fendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Nick M. Dodas, was the owner ana
operator of a restaurant located at 947 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, and known as Rhoda's Lunch.
Defendant, Rhoda Dodas, is the wife of defendant, Nick
M. Dodas, and worked with Mr. Dodas as a waitress.
Sometime in June, 1964, Mr. Dodas contemplated open·
ing a new and larger restaurant with a lounge. Plain·
tiffs heard of Mr. Dodas' plans and contacted him and
requested that they be given opportunity to bid to do the
interior decoration of the proposed new restaurant ana
lounge and part of the construction. An agreement was
entered with Mr. Dodas in the latter part of June or
early part of July, 1964, whereby plaintiffs, pursuant to
plans and drawings made by them (R. 59-60), would do
a portion of the construction, remodelling and interior
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decoration on the new lounge and restaurant at an
agreed contract price of $1,600.00, which contract price
is disputed. Mr. Dodas then paid to the plaintiffs
$600.00 cash in advance in July, 1964, prior to plaintiffs
commencing work (R. 118). Plaintiffs then commenced
to perform the work contracted for in the remodelling
of the new restaurant, which consisted of furnishing of
materials, subcontracting a portion of the work out to
third parties, construction and installation of a back bar
and canopy, installation of wall coverings, construction
and installation of room dividers, partitions and panels,
installation of a metal railing and the installation of
acoustical finish on the dance floor ceiling. (Exhibit 5P, page 129) At the time the work contracted for was
completed by plaintiffs in October of 1964, defendant,
Nick M. Dodas, paid to the plaintiffs the additional
sum of $1,000.00, which was the balance due on the contract. Mr. Dodas then commenced doing business in the
new restaurant and lounge in November 1964, to 1967
when he suffered a heart attack which prohibited him
from continuing in his business for several months. The
restaurant was sold to Mrs. Dodas and incorporated by
her under the name Rhoda's Restaurant on or about the
13th day of October 1967. (Exhibit 11-D)
No other payments were made by defendant, Nick
M. Dodas, to the plaintiffs on the oral contract. Approximately four years later on or about April 5, 1968, plaintiffs received two checks drawn on the corporation's account, Rhoda's Restaurant, (Exhibits 7-D and 8-D) in
payment for certain goods and a new bench purchased
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by the corporation in the year 1968 ( R. 134-135) . Mr.
Dodas had no ownership whatsoever in Rhoda's Rest·
aurant, a corporation, from the time the restaurant was
sold to Mrs. Dodas and incorporated, and did not con.
tract with plaintiffs for the goods and bench. Plaintiffs,
without first filing a certificate of doing business under
assumed name, as required by law, commenced the sub.
ject action some five years after the contract with Mr.
Dodas, which action resulted in a judgment against both
defendants in favor of plaintiffs. The corporation,
Rhoda's Restaurant, was never made a party to the ac.
tion of plaintiffs.
POINT I.
GRANTED AGAINST DEFENDANT, RHODA
DODAS, IN THAT SHE DID NOT CONTRACT
WITH PLAINTIFFS, AND WAS NOT THE
OWNER OF RHODA'S LUNCH.
Plaintiffs were under the mistaken assumption that
the restaurant operated by Mr. Dodas under the name
Rhoda's Lunch was a restaurant owned by the defend·
ants jointly (R. 76). Mr. Reid stated on direct exarni·
nation (R. 57), that he first met the defendants in the
year 1963 in a restaurant owned by Mr. Dodas on South
State Street; that as far as he knew, defendants both
worked in the restaurant. The record is completely de·
void of any actual knowledge on the part of plaintiffs as
to the true ownership of the restaurant at the time of the
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contract herein. The evidence clearly shows that the
plaintiffs assumed that the restaurant was jointly owned
by the defendants due to the use of the name "Rhoda's"
(R. 76). The only significance of the use of the name
"Rhoda's" is to the effect that this was the name of Mr.
Dodas' wife (R. 115). The testimony of both Mr. and
Mrs. Dodas is to the effect that Mr. Dodas was the sole
owner of Rhoda's Lunch at the time the contract between defendant, Nick M. Dodas, was entered into with
plaintiffs (R. 116, R. 143).
Plaintiffs had the burden of proving without speculation, by a proponderance of the evidence, that both defendants contracted for labor and materials for which
plaintiffs sought judgment. (See Alvarado v. Tucker, 2
U.2d 16, 268 P.2d 986) The mere fact that Mrs. Dodas
was an employee of Mr. Dodas and was present at a few
of the meetings between plaintiffs and Mr. Dodas during negotiations subsequent to the oral contract between Mr. Dodas and plaintiffs would not of itself constitute a contract with Mrs. Dodas and plaintiffs, there
being no meeting of the minds. The testimony of plaintiffs as to the alleged contract of Mrs. Dodas is based
upon their assumption that she was a partner and coowner of Rhoda's Lunch at the time the contract was
entered into and not upon any factual proof to that
effect. Both the defendants dispute plaintiffs claim that
Mrs. Dodas in any manner contracted with the plaintiffs
for the remodelling and construction of the restaurant
and lounge. Further, the evidence presented showed that
the payments admittedly received by the plaintiffs pur-
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suant to the oral contract in the sum of $1,600.00 were
made by Mr. Dodas (R. l18, R. 132). The assumptions
of plaintiffs are insufficient to prove a contractual re.
lationship between themselves and Mrs. Dodas. (See
29 AmJur 2d, pg. 174, Evidence§ 140) Plaintiffs failed
to prove any contractual relationship between them.
selves and Mrs. Dodas by a proponderance of the evj.
dence. The granting of a judgment against Mrs. Dodas
by the lower court under the facts presented was error
and the same should be reversed.
POINT II.
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT AGAINST DE.
FENDANTS FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED
IN THAT THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO
PROVE THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
THE MATERIALS FURNISHED AND SERV·
ICES RENDERED.
The Court erred in allowing documents presented
as exhibits by plaintiffs to be testified to before a
proper foundation had been laid and admitted them im·
properly into evidence without a showing that the par·
ticular exhibits represented expenditures for materials
that were actually furnished to Mr. Dodas and for labor
that was actually performed in the remodelling and con·
struction of the restaurant and lounge for Mr. Dodas
(R. 62-73). (See 30 AmJur 2d, pg. 39, Evidence§ 918)
Testimony on vor dire of plaintiff, Mr. Reid, was to the
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effect that there was no indication on any of the cancelled checks as represented by Exhibit 1-P, that the
expenditures were for materials furnished to Mr. Dodas
and labor performed on his restaurant-lounge ( R. 6768) . Plaintiff Reid testified that he had expended some
$404.32 on foil paper. (See Exhibit 1-P) On cross-examination it was brought out that the expenditure for
foil paper was not only for the Dodas job, but for other
jobs which the plaintiffs were in the process of doing
(R. 84-85). Plaintiffs had the burden to prove the "reasonable value for the materials and services" claimed by
a proponderance of the evidence. That the materials furnished and labor performed for which they were claiming a sum due had actually been furnished and performed in the construction and remodelling of the restaurant-lounge. The documentary evidence presented by
the plaintiffs was improperly admitted by the court
without proper foundation, contained many discrepancies (R. 84-89), and were not properly identified as business records. For the reasons stated, the lower court committed an error in granting judgment against defendants based upon the improperly admitted evidence (Exhibits 1-P, 2-P, 3-P, 4-P) and that plaintiffs failed to
meet their burden of proof as to the reasonable value of
the "materials furnished and services performed" in the
sum of $1,613.75. Thus judgment should be reversed
and judgment of no cause of action entered against the
plaintiffs in favor of the defendants,
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POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED
TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN THAT THEY ACTED AS A CONTRAc:
TOR WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A LI.
CENSE AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
Title 58-23-3 ( 3) defines a contractor as follows:
"Contractor: Any person, firm, co-partnership,
corporation, association, or other organization or
any combination of any thereof, who, for a
sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensa·
tion other than wages, undertakes with another
for the construction, alteration, repair, addition
to or improvement of any building, or any part
thereof * * *, but shall not include anyone whn
merely furnishes materials or s11 pplies witlwul
fabricating the same into, or consuming the sarru
in the performance of the work of the contractors
as herein defined." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the plaintiffs acted as contractors within
the meaning of 58-23-3 (3) of the Utah Code Annotated
in that they employed subcontractors in the remodelling
and construction of the restaurant-lounge for Mr. Dodas
(R. 62-66, R. 78, R. 80); bid to do work for a fixed sum
other than wages (R. 60, R. 84); purchased materiah
from suppliers and consumed the materials in the fabri·
cation of dividers and partitions in the performance of
the work contracted for (R. 81, 98, 99), without first ob·
taining a license purusant to Title 58-23-1 of the Utah
Code Annotated as amended (R. 64, 79).

Title 58-23-1 provides as follows:
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"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, co* * * or other organization, or any
combmation of any thereof, to engage in the business or act in the capacity of contractor within
the State without having a license therefore as
herein
unless such person, firm, copartnersh1p, * * * or other organization is particularly exempted as provided in this act. Evidence
of * * * the employment of any person on a construction project, or the offering of any bid to do
work of a contractor as herein defined, shall be
accepted in any court of the State of Utah as
prima facie evidence of engaging in the business
or acting in the capacity of a contractor." (Emphasis added.)

Exhibit 5-P represents the charges claimed by plaintiffs
for materials purchased and labor performed in completing the remodelling and construction of the restaurant-lounge for Mr. Dodas (R. 78-84). The charges for
labor and materials are in addition to the amount charged
by plaintiffs for design, consultation and preparation of
plans for the interior design and decorating of the new
restaurant-lounge for Mr. Dodas as set forth in the record at page 82. Plaintiffs claim that they expended the
sum of $877.38 for building materials; hired subcontractors to aid them in doing the work contracted (R.
98-99) ; and allegedly agreed to do the work for a bid
price not to exceed $3,500.00 (R. 60). These facts
establish, prim a f acie, that, plaintiffs engaged in the
business and acted in the capacity of a contractor. In
light of the evidence presented by plaintiffs as set forth
above, it is impossible for plaintiffs to escape the fact
that they acted as contractors within the meaning of 58-
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23-3 (3) of the Utah Code Annotated in bidding and
doing remodelling and construction of the new restau.
rant-lounge of Mr. Dodas. Further, plaintiffs cannot
escape the fact that at the time they acted as contractors
they did not have any type of contractors license, wheth'.
er it be a general contractors license or speciality con.
tractors license, nor were they licensed at any time prior
to the time they submitted a bid to Mr. Dodas, during
the time that they claimed the work was performed or
subsequent thereto (R. 79, R. 83, R. 107).
The law in the State of Utah is clear as to the right
of persons to claim payment for material furnished and
labor performed in connection with construction proj.
ects where such persons or firms have not first obtained
a contractor's license as required by law. The statutory
requirement to obtain a license for engaging in the work
as a contractor is a police regulation for the protection of
the public. (Dow v. United States, 154 F.2d 707, 710)
A contract entered into by one such as the plaintiffs in
this case, when he was not licensed as required by 58-23·
I of the Utah Code Annotated, is void and unenforceable since the statute is enacted for the protection of the
public. (Olsen v. Reese, 117 U. 411 ,200 P.2d 733;Ek·
lund v .Elwell, 116 U. 521, 211 P.2d 849; Lyman v.
Taylor, 12 U.2d 362, 384 P.2d 401; Moseley v. Johman,
22 U.2d 348, 453 P.2d 149)
In order for the plaintiffs to have stated a cause of
action on contract for labor performed and
furnished, they must have alleged that they were li·
censed contractors as required by 58-23-1 of the Utan
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Code Annotated at the time the contract was entered
into. The complaint of plaintiffs, (R. 1) , contained no
such allegation in claiming on contract for an amount
due for "materials and services," which consisted of "interior design, construction and installation of said materials for a restaurant and lounge known as Rhoda's
Club Charade." Plaintiffs in failing to allege that they
were licensed contractors, coupled with the facts that
they acted as contractors and did not have a contractors
license as required by law, failed to state a cause of action and the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs. (See Smith v. American Packing
and Provision Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P.2d 951, Olsen v.

Reese, Supra.)

At no time during the course of the preceedings
did the plaintiffs allege or claim an exemption from
the act or present evidence to rebut the presumption
of 58-23-1, except to state that they possessed a retail merchants license issued by the City of Salt Lake
City and a Sales Tax License issued by the State of
Utah (R. 107). This claim is without merit and would
not exempt plaintiffs under the act. (See Nickel v.
Walker, 1964 N.M. 395 P.2d 679).
It is clear under the law of the State of Utah as
contained in Title 58-23-1 and 58-23-3 {3) of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and the Utah cases
cited that the lower court should have dismissed the
of plaintiffs in that the same was void for the
failure of the plaintiffs to have a valid contractors li-
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cense as required by law. (See Olsen v. Reese, Supra·
Platt v. Locke, 11 U.2d 273, 358 P.2d 95).
'
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS
IN THAT THEIR CLAIM WAS BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The oral contract upon which plaintiffs based their
cause of action against defendants arose some time in
the early part of July, 1964. The period in which suit
can be brought is governed by the provisions of 78-12·
25 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
which provides, to wit:
" (I) An action upon a contract, obligation or lia·
bility not founded upon an instrument in writing;
* * * also, on an open account for work, labor, or
services rendered, or materials furnished; pro·
vided that action in all of the fore going cases may
be commenced any time within four years after
the last charge is made or the last payment is re·
ceived." (Emphasis added.)
It is not disputed from the evidence that the last pay·
ment received by the plaintiffs from Mr. Dodas on the
oral contract was in October, 1964, in the sum of
$1,000.00; nor that the suit commenced by plaintiffs on
the oral contract was commenced on or about June 19,
1970, more than four years from the date of last payment.
It is the contention of plaintiffs that the last payment re·
ceived from defendants was on or about April 5, 1968,as
represented by Exhibits 7-D and 8-D. It is the conten·
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ti on of defendants that the April 5, 1968, payment was
made by a corporation, for and on behalf of the corporation, and was not a payment on the oral contract sued
upon by plaintiffs herein. Exhibits 7-D and 8-D clearly
show that the payment was in fact made by the corporation, drawn on the corporation's bank account, and according to the testimony of Mrs. Dodas, was payment for
goods purchased by the corporation, for the corporation
account. The payment was not a payment for Mr. Dodas
for the remodelling of the restaurant, he having paid
plaintiffs in full (R. 95, R. 146). Plaintiffs admitted
that additional cards and signs were purchased by Mrs.
Dodas, but denied that Mrs. Dodas purchased a bench
and that the payment was for those items. In any event,
the payment by the corporation, a separate and new entity and not a party to be charged on the oral contract,
was for new goods and merchandise purchased, and did
not suspend the running of the statute of limitations
against defendants Mr. and Mrs. Dodas. (See Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 U. 387, 45 P.2d 565, 98 ALR 1006;
Morris v. Russell, 120 U. 545, 236 P.2d 451 distinguished in I U.2d 175, 176, 264 P.2d 279, 280, 26 ALR
947) In the case of Holloway v. Wetzel, Supra. the Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated:
"Part payment of either principal or interest by
several obligors does
one of two or more joint
not of itself suspend running of the statute of
limitations against other co-obligors, since the
statute contemplates the making of payment by
the party himself or hy someone authorized by
him." (Emphasis added.)
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Both defendants testified that the payment made bi
the corporation on or about April 5, 1968, was not a pay.
.for
Dodas on the oral contract sued on bi
plambffs, m that Mr. Dodas had no ownership in the
corporation or authority to transact business for the cor.
poration. Without a proper showing by the plaintiffs
that the pyament was in fact a payment on behalf of Mr.
Dodas on the oral contract and authorized by him, a
tolling of the statute of limitations did not occur and the
action was barred as a matter of law. If we assume that
the lower court regarded the corporation as an assignee
of the defendants, there being no evidence as to how the
court regarded the corporate entity, payment by thecor·
poration as assignee of defendants would not toll the
statute of limitations. (See Holloway v. Wetzel, Supra.;
Upton v. Heizetl Construction Company, 116 U. 83,20!
P.2d 945) The lower court should have denied the claim
of plaintiffs against defendants for the reason that the
same was barred as a matter of law by the statute ol
limitations.

CONCLUSION
Defendants assert that the action of plaintiffs
should have been dismissed as to both defendants in that
(I) there was insufficient evidence presented by plain·
tiffs to legally obligate Mrs. Dodas to the alleged oral
contract between Mr. Dodas and plaintiffs; (2) that the
complaint of plaintiffs alleged an action based upon open
account for "materials and services" and quantum mer·
iut, but the evidence presented was a claim for labor per·
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formed and materials furnished on oral contract in the
remodelling and construction of a restaurant-lounge
without proof as to the reasonable value of the labor performed and materials furnished; (3) that plaintiffs'
claim was void as a matter of law in that they acted as a
contractor without first obtaining a contractors license
as required by law under the provisions of Ttitle 58-23-1
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and ( 4)
that action of plaintiffs was barred by the statute of
limitations, Title 78-12-25 of the Utah Code Annotated,
in that the action was commenced by plaintiffs more than
four years from the date of last payment, October, 1964.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants should be reversed and a judgment entered against the plaintiffs
for no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
E. H. Fankhauser of
COTRO-MANES, WARR,
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY
430 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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